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Abstract 
In this paper I address the problem of the unrealisticness of assumptions 
in neoclassical economics
2. Being accused of using highly unrealistic 
assumptions in its models, neoclassical economics replied through what 
later was called the F-twist. Shortly stated, it was claimed that 
descriptively unrealistic assumptions are ubiquitous in other sciences 
also, and that economics should be concerned with its predictions 
instead of its assumptions. The immediate implication of this statement 
was that all unrealistic assumptions are the same – they are harmlessly 
unrealistic. Philosophers of economics vivaciously debated this claim 
and argued that economics made use of several kinds of assumptions 
which ”had better be true”
3. Building on this debate I introduce the notion 
of uniformity assumptions and I argue that in certain conditions they ”had 
better be true”. 
 
Keywords: unrealistic assumptions, uniformity assumptions, 
neoclassical economics. 
 
Unrealisticness of assumptions  
Neoclassical economics faced a long list of charges in its history from 
“then” to “now”. Leontiev (1971) argued that it became a “mathematical 
model building industry” (Leontief, 1971: 2). In the same respect, Solow 
(1997) noted that it displays a tendency of theorizing at the expense of 
data, because ”theory is cheap, data are expensive” (Solow, 1997: 57). 
Coase (1992) labelled it as “a system which lives in the minds of 
economists but not on Earth” (Coase, 1992: 714) or as “blackboard 
economics” (Coase, 1992: 714). Blaug (2002) diagnosed it as “being 
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2 This includes also neoclassical economics extensions into other domains as mentioned 
by Stigler (1984): the economics of law, the new economic history,  the economic 
analysis of social structure and behavior and the economic analysis of politics or public 
choice theory. (Stigler, 1984: 303) 
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sick” (and)
4  increasingly becoming an intellectual game played for its 
own sake and not for its practical consequences”. (Blaug in Maki, 2002: 
36). All these accusations could be translated into one problem, the 
unrealisticness of the assumptions of the neoclassical economics. 
This problem had already received a much celebrated answer from 
Milton Friedman. In (1966, 1966) Friedman talked about the “realism of 
[…] assumptions” (Friedman, 1966: p.14) and argued that economics 
should be concerned with its predictions not with the descriptive 
unrealisticness of its assumptions because “they never are”; (they 
should only be) “sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in 
hand” (Friedman, 1966: 15). So models should be tested regardless the 
degree of unrealisticness of some of their particular assumptions. To 
argue for this idea, Friedman gave an example from physics, the law of 
falling bodies. The accepted hypothesis that the acceleration of a body 
dropped in a vacuum is a constant g, could be applied to various real life 
situations, let’s say, dropping a cannon ball from the Pisa tower. The ball 
would fall as if there was a vacuum. From this, Friedman argued that 
“the formula is accepted because it works, not because we live in an 
approximate vacuum - whatever that means.” (Friedman, 1966: 18) So 
the unrealisticness of an assumption did not impede with the models 
prediction quality. As mentioned in the abstract, that implied that 
unrealistic assumptions were harmless – they were just useful fictions 
and we should focus on the outputs of our models not on their inputs.  
 
In (1981) Musgrave noted that in the F-twist “[...] Friedman defended the 
apparently absurd view that `unreal assumptions` are not a vice but 
virtue.” (Musgrave, 1981: 377)” This argument “sparked a vigorous 
controversy which has continued right up to the present day” (Musgrave, 
1981: 377). Starting from Friedman’s argument Musgrave argued that 
Friedman failed to “distinguish between three different types of 
assumptions, each of which makes a different type of assertion and 
therefore plays a different role in a theory” (Musgrave, 1981: 378) So, 
starting from the different functions that assumptions could hold in a 
model, Musgrave identified the negligibility assumptions, the domain 
assumptions and the heuristic assumptions. The first type, the 
negligibility assumptions concern the impact of a factor F “which might 
be expected to affect (a) phenomenon (but) actually has no effect upon 
it, or at least no detectable effect.” (Musgrave, 1981: 378). The vacuum 
assumption from Friedman`s example of falling bodies could be an 
example of such assumptions: “the effect of air resistance is negligible” 
(Musgrave, 1981: 378) Of course not all the factors not stated in a model 
are in fact negligibility assumptions. Musgrave assumed that we did not 
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usually have explicitly stated assumptions about the negligibility of 
factors like the day of the week on which the experiment was performed 
or about the experimenter’s eyes color. “Negligibility assumptions are 
stated only for factors which might be expected to have some effect but 
which, we claim, will not.” (Musgrave, 1981: 378) The second class, the 
domain assumptions specify the domain of a theory. Musgrave 
formulated this as a second step assumption: “What begins as a 
negligibility assumption, when it gets refuted, turn into a domain 
assumption” (Musgrave, 1981: 381]. So if a negligibility assumption that 
a factor F has negligible effect is proved to be false, the domain of the 
theory may be restricted. The researcher “may retain the assumption 
that F is absent, but now use it to specify the domain of applicability of 
his theory” (Musgrave, 1981: 381) Musgrave argued further that this 
radical change in a given theory could “go unnoticed because the same 
form of words is used to express both assumptions. An economist who 
says 'assume the government has a balanced budget' may mean that 
any actual budget imbalance can be ignored because its effects on the 
phenomena he is investigating are negligible. But he may also mean 
precisely the opposite: that budget imbalance would have significant 
effects, so that his theory will only apply where such an imbalance does 
not exist” (Musgrave, 1981: 381). Finally, the third class, the heuristic 
assumptions, designates a two stage approach. “When a scientist finds 
that his domain assumption are never true (if it is to have a testable 
theory) […] he must take into account the factor F whose presence he 
took first to be negligible and then to limit the domain of applicability of 
his theory. But he may wish to develop such a theory in two stages: in 
the first stage he takes no account of factor F, or assumes that it is 
negligible; in the second stage he takes account of it and says what 
difference it makes to his results. Here the assumption that factor F is 
negligible is merely a heuristic device, a way of simplifying the logical 
development of the theory”. (Musgrave,1981: 382,383). 
 
In (2000) Mäki labeled Musgrave’s (1981) taxonomy of assumptions as 
successful “because it clarifies certain aspects of the assumptions 
controversy” (Mäki, 2000: 317) and argued that further clarifications 
were needed. First of them concerned the negligibility assumptions and 
Musgrave`s formulation of it. Mäki noted that what was surprising about 
Musgrave`s definition “is that it does not mention the idea of negligibility 
at all; it talks about detectability” (Mäki, 2000: 319). Further, Mäki 
pointed out that “a negligible effect does not also have to be 
undetectable. […] negligibility presupposes detectability: in order to 
rationally judge whether an effect is negligible, one has to be able to 
measure it! [...] This means that [...] Musgrave has actually characterized 
a separate type of assumption” (Mäki, 2000: 320]. Another problem was Innovative Issues and Approaches in Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 2 
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that a factor which had no effect was not a factor with a negligible effect. 
Mäki argued that “while negligibility is a context-specific notion [...] there 
is no context-specific [...] about a factor having no effect” (Mäki, 2000: 
322]. So, a no-effect factor was irrelevant not negligible. Therefore we 
got an adequate definition: “A negligibility assumption is the hypothesis 
that some factor F that might be expected to affect the phenomenon 
under investigation actually has an effect upon it small enough to be 
neglected relative to a given purpose” (Mäki, 2000: 322). Starting from 
this new definition Mäki argued like Musgrave that “It is good for the 
theory – including its predictive abilities – if they (the negligibility 
assumptions) are true” (Mäki, 2000: 322). So the F-twist must be 
untwisted in the case of negligibility assumptions. The second 
clarification concerns Musgrave`s domain assumption. Mäki argued that 
there was a problem with Musgrave’s domain assumptions because 
their identity was not clear. “It is not quite clear whether the relevant 
domain assumption is intended to be the non-paraphrased statement 
DB: `the government has a balanced budget` or the meta level 
paraphrase DB*: `the theory only applies where budget imbalance is 
absent” (Mäki, 2000: 324). Reading between Musgrave`s lines, Mäki 
decided that he intended to talk about DB. Starting from this observation, 
Mäki suggested that actually it was DB* that would better express a 
domain assumption. From this, in order to have a domain assumption in 
Musgrave’s spirit (but not in its form) we must have a statement about 
reality (the government has a balanced budget) and a meta-statement 
(the theory applies only where ...). At this point Mäki makes a distinction 
between domain assumption (first kind of statement) and applicability 
assumption (the second kind). For example: “the assumption that the 
agents’ behavior is solely calculative and self-seeking may serve as a 
domain assumption, while the assumption that that assumption applies 
to market behavior but not – or alternatively: as well as – to political or 
family behavior, is an applicability assumption” (Mäki, 2000: 325). 
Finally, Mäki analyzes the third of Musgrave’s assumptions, the heuristic 
ones. They should be understood in a dynamic context and could be 
labeled as first step assumptions or early step assumptions. Actually 
what we have is an assumption and a promise of forthcoming relaxation 
the form of the following sentences: “(B): `The government has a 
balanced budget` (and) E-SB: `(B) is an element in an early formulation 
of the theory and will be removed as the theory is developed`” (Mäki, 
2000: 326). So what we need is to acknowledge the necessity of a meta-
statement as in the case of the domain-applicability assumptions. From 
the preceding clarifications, Mäki critically argues that even though the 
first two kinds of assumptions „had better be true”, in the case of early 
step assumptions, Musgrave’s conclusion does not hold. His argument 
goes something like the following: first, an early step assumption Innovative Issues and Approaches in Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 2 
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involves a false negligibility assumption. Second, this negligibility 
assumption must be supplemented with a promise that the falseness will 
be removed in a later step. From this, Mäki argues against Musgrave’s 
conclusion that negligibility assumption needs to be true. If the first step 
needs to be true then it would be incoherent to say that in a later step 
the false negligibility assumption will be relaxed to a true one. I believe 
this argument aims to a potential problem with Musgrave’s conclusion, 
rather than to an actual one. As Mäki acknowledged, Musgrave’s 
statement of the heuristic assumptions was not very clear. Another 
reading of this type (other than Mäki’s) of assumption could be that if 
there is an assumption with heuristic value, then in the first stage we 
could employ a false negligibility assumption, while in the second stage 
we could not make another false negligibility assumption. I believe this is 
the correct reading of Musgrave’s intentions. Two stages of false 
negligibility assumptions do not make much sense, and Musgrave does 
not seem to be unable to understand that.  
 
In (2005), (2006), Hindriks analyzed the Musgrave-Mäki battle of 
assumptions and made several corrections. Hindriks (2005) noted that 
Mäki`s suggestions and changes in Musgrave`s typology must be seen 
as improvements in need for further amendments. First, Hindriks 
distinguished between first order and second order assumptions. A first 
order assumption is, for example, one that assumes that “a certain factor 
F has no effect on the phenomenon under investigation” (Hindriks, 2005: 
391). A second order assumption on the other hand, “provides reasons 
for imposing first-order assumptions” (Hindriks, 2005: 391). In a later 
(2006) formulation, these assumptions are described as explaining “the 
purpose for which or the reason why an (a first order) assumption is 
imposed [...] such assumptions elucidate the roles that particular first-
order assumptions play”. (Hindriks, 2006: 407). Starting from these 
definitions, Hindriks argues that they describe a new framework for 
analyzing the assumption issue. This allegation is not entirely true 
though. Mäki made a similar distinction regarding applicability 
assumptions and early step assumptions (as noted above). He 
contended that these types of assumptions were meta-statements about 
the applicability and about the future development of an assumption. 
That implied that Mäki also implicitly formulated a (restricted at two types 
of assumption) two-order approach to assumptions. In this view even 
though Hindriks’ statement about the novelty of his approach is 
somewhat exaggerated, the framework he described is useful for a 
better understanding of the assumptions issue. In this framework he 
advocated that “assumptions such as negligibility and applicability are 
second-order assumptions” (Hindriks, 2006: 407). This move leaves us 
with a first order assumption and two different reasons (which should be Innovative Issues and Approaches in Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 2 
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explicitly stated) for assuming it. Further, Hindriks did a second 
amendment to the Musgrave-Mäki battle of assumptions. He replaced 
the heuristic assumptions with what he called tractability assumptions. 
The latter are statements “about the tractability of a problem. The idea is 
that a problem would be intractable if it were not for a particular first-
order assumption” (Hindriks, 2006: 410). Stated in more of Hindriks’ 
words, “tractability is a matter of solubility or of the efficiency of a 
solution. A problem is intractable if it cannot be solved; a problem is 
more tractable with a certain assumption than without it if it can be 
solved more easily or efficiently in that case”. (Hindriks, 2005: 392). 
Hindriks further divides tractability assumptions into theoretical and 
empirical. “Problem P may be the problem of how to apply a certain 
theory T to a particular situation. An assumption that is imposed in order 
to solve such a problem is an empirical tractability problem. An 
assumption that is needed for solving a problem that is independent 
from the application of the theory is a theoretical tractability assumption” 
(Hindriks, 2005: 392). His argument for the replacement of heuristic 
assumptions with tractability assumptions is that of rationalizing after the 
fact: “The process of theory development can rarely be planned this 
way” (as a second step) [...] The claim that a first-order assumption will 
turn out to have heuristic value can at most be an educated guess at the 
time it is imposed. In such cases it will often be more convincing to state 
that the main reason for imposing the assumption was tractability, 
perhaps combined with a hope of being able to do without it one day”. 
(Hindriks, 2006: 415,416). Regarding Mäki’s early step assumptions, 
Hindriks contention was that they missed the heuristic point originally 
given by Musgrave and that it did not make sense to impose a first order 
assumption and remove it later. In his words, “it simply does not make 
sense to say that a first-order assumption is made so that it can be 
removed later [...] if the assumption is to be relaxed later on, why impose 
it in the first place? (Hindriks, 2006: 417). Hindriks’ conclusion was that 
the purpose of explaining why economists imposed false assumptions 
was better served by his notion of tractability assumptions. In his view, 
this notion should replace heuristic/early step assumptions. Regarding 
the problem of falsity from definition, tractability assumptions are forced 
steps in model building. If Newton had the mathematical apparatus 
needed for his theory, then he could have done without his “one planet” 
assumption. So a tractability assumption is a false assumption we hope 
to remove in the future. Being forced false assumptions, we cannot 
expect them to be true (as we can with negligibility and applicability 
assumptions). 
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The role of assumptions’ effects in building a typology 
In this section I have two goals. First, I argue against Mäki-Hindriks’ 
typology of assumptions that the second order assumptions are in most 
cases inoperable. Second, I argue that the reasons for using a certain 
assumption are not always specified and it could be more fruitful to 
concentrate on assumptions’ effects in the model world.  
 
Though I am not a trained philosopher, it is my belief that the philosophy 
of science should be concerned with the operability of its concepts. This 
is the ground on which I build my critique of Mäki-Hindriks’ second order 
typology of assumptions. I think that concepts should display the 
property of operability. They should be able to be transformed in a way 
that allows us to use them in analyzing scientific theories. My contention 
is a mild one: I won’t say that inoperable (or less operable) concepts are 
useless; I will only say that it is better to work with concepts we are able 
to use to make sense of scientific practice. I believe that scientific 
practice, in general, lacks meta-statements about the reason of 
employing certain assumptions. If we search only for these meta-
statements we won’t be able to conclude much about those reasons
5. If 
we want that negligibility, applicability, domain, heuristic, early step or 
tractability assumptions to matter we must not think of them as only 
second order assumptions. Returning to Musgrave’s example, “A: The 
government has a balanced budget”, I think that there are two distinct 
ways to avoid the lack of operability of Mäki-Hindriks proposal. The first 
is returning to Musgrave original method of identifying the function an 
assumption have without a meta-statement the kind of “assumption A is 
made because...”. The second, and I favour this approach here, is to 
focus on the effects that a certain assumption have in the model world. 
So, in the first case if we get lucky and find a meta-statement, then we 
are done. If the meta-statement is missing, we could employ Musgrave’s 
method. Of course, this method has its shortcomings. Guessing about 
the reasons is not an easy and exact enterprise. In addition, even 
though Musgrave (1981), Mäki (1994), (2000), (2002), Hindriks (2005), 
(2006) talked (implicitly or explicitly) about the functions that 
assumptions have in a model, one thing was never clear (at least to me) 
in their analyses. They never talked (at least not explicitly enough) about 
the possibility of joint functions. An assumption can have more than one 
function in a model. One can buy apples for their taste and in the same 
times because of their vitamins. One can employ the same false 
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method of identifying the type of an assumption in a given model does not request a 
meta-statement and it is something resembling guessing about whatever functions 
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assumption by more than one reason. This seems to be neglected by 
Musgrave-Mäki-Hindriks typologies. Taking an example, from the realm 
of a neoclassical political science
6, Niskanen’s (1975) budget 
maximizing assumption from its bureaucracy models, could be 
interpreted in several ways: First, we could have a function of 
negligibility: “other reasons for action than budget maximizing can be 
neglected”. Second we could have a function of tractability: “budget 
maximizing assumption makes the problem tractable”. Third we could 
have joint functions of negligibility and tractability (there is nothing to 
prevent us to have more than one reason for using a certain 
assumption). The same goes with the neoclassical principle of 
maximization. It has tractability functions, but in the same time it might 
be read as a negligibility assumption. The possibility of joint functions 
adds a little more mess to the job of identifying the reason for employing 
unrealistic assumptions. This is why I choose to focus on the obvious 
effects that assumptions have in a model world. By an effect of an 
assumption I mean a result that employing a certain assumption could 
have. This result could be deliberate or non-intentional. Suppose that the 
only reason to employ the budget maximizing assumption is tractability. 
In the same time, we will have the effect of negligibility because, for the 
reasons of tractability, we will disregard any causal power of other (than 
budget maximization) motivations for action that bureaucrats could have. 
Scientific practice may not offer enough information to identify functions, 
but the effects of making a certain assumption are always visible. The 
most obvious effect that some assumptions achieve in neoclassical 
models is that of uniformity. This effect is achieved by what I will label as 
uniformity assumptions. The reasons may be those of tractability or of 
negligibility or applicability, but the reasons are not my primary interest 
here.  
 
To further discuss the class of uniformity assumptions, it is necessary to 
mention another typology which started with Machlup’s (1955) paper. 
This involves a hierarchization of assumptions by their importance. 
While in Musgrave’s taxonomy all assumptions are at the same level of 
importance, in Machlup-Mäki’s (and others) taxonomy, assumptions are 
ordered by their significance. Machlup distinguished between 
fundamental assumptions (for example Newton’s three laws of motion, 
or neoclassical economics’ rationality postulate) and specific 
assumptions (for example, that there is a quota for the importation of 
sugar which is fully utilized). A similar (hierarchical) approach was 
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proposed, more recently, by Mäki (1994), (2000). He wrote about types 
of assumptions and their function and distinguished between core 
assumptions and peripheral assumptions. Core assumptions “serve to 
sort out what is believed to be the most central force [...]” (Mäki, 1994: 
244]; for example, Galilei’s statement that bodies were attracted by the 
gravitational field of the Earth, measured by parameter g, or the 
assumption that agents maximized). Peripheral assumptions “serve to 
neutralize factors that are not regarded as central or essential to the 
phenomenon” (Mäki, 1994: 244); for example, Galilei’s vacuum 
assumption, or neoclassical economics’ perfect divisibility of goods 
assumption. In (2000) Mäki argued that Musgrave seemed to limit his 
analysis to peripheral assumptions and that that was not a legitimate 
move: “both core assumptions and peripheral assumption can in 
principle serve as negligibility, applicability and early step assumptions
7” 
(Mäki, 2000: 329).  
 
The notions of fundamental/core and peripheral/specific assumptions 
are useful here in two ways. The first issue is about Hindriks’ tractability 
assumptions. The second, and my main interest here, is about uniformity 
assumptions. I will discuss them consecutively. Hindriks’ (2005) (2006) 
papers are mainly concerned with explaining why economists use 
unrealistic assumptions. As I already noted, the reason Hindriks 
identified, was the new class of tractability assumptions, defined as 
legitimate forced, hopefully temporary, falsities. The first point I want to 
make is that if the concept of tractability has in its core the idea of 
manageability of a problem, then we could think about the possibility of 
realistic tractability assumptions. From the class of assumptions we 
could made by reasons of tractability, we should choose realistic ones. 
Of course if realistic tractability assumptions were the rule of scientific 
practice, there would have been no reason for Hindriks to write the two 
papers. My point is just that the concept of tractability is consistent with 
realisticness of assumptions. This being said, there are two other 
problems about tractability which I want to address. The first of these is 
about the meaning of tractability, while the second is about its domain. 
Regarding the meaning, my first reading of tractability assumptions was 
in terms of “how to best solve a problem”, with the path to solution left 
empty. My second reading was in terms of “how to solve a problem in a 
certain way”. The path to solution is, in this later reading, specified. I 
think the second reading is in Hindriks’ spirit. All of his examples are 
about tractability in a certain way. In (2010), Kuorikoski, Lehtinen and 
Marchionni, explicitly label Hindriks’ tractability assumptions as 
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mathematical tractability assumptions: “Some modeling assumptions are 
thus introduced only for reasons of mathematical tractability (see 
Hindriks [2006]).” (Kuorikoski, Lehtinen, Marchionni, 2010: 547). So 
Hindriks’ tractability assumptions are a subset of what could be called 
methodological biased tractability. They specify a path to solution. The 
second problem, connected to the antecedent one, is with tractability 
assumptions’ domain. It is difficult to figure out if these falsities could 
appear (in Hindriks’ view) in the case of core assumptions. Hindriks’ 
definition of tractability and his examples seem to be about peripheral 
assumptions. I think that there is nothing to prevent us to talk about 
tractability of the core assumptions. If we make this step (which I am not 
sure Hindriks did) then we should have the new class of 
methodologically biased tractability core assumptions and a subset of 
this class, mathematical tractability core assumptions. By Hindriks’ 
definition, these must be false core assumptions made by reasons of 
mathematical tractability. The problem, as I see it, is what role these 
assumptions have in bringing the result. I will modify here Mäki’s 
definition of core assumption from “what is believed to be the most 
central force” to what is pervasive to models from a discipline. Mäki’s 
definition is clearly a realist one and the realist bias is not of great use 
here. If core assumptions are ubiquitous assumptions (without 
commitment to their causal force), then if they happen to be 
mathematical tractability assumptions also, then they must be totally 
robust. I will elaborate this idea later.  
 
Turning back to uniformity assumptions, these are effects rather than 
reasons. When we look at neoclassical economics’ (and Public choice 
theory’s) model world, we see different kinds of uniformity. The reasons 
are less important (even though I think mathematical tractability is the 
main reason), the important thing is that uniformity is the rule. Building 
on Machlup-Mäki typology, uniformity may be local or global. By global 
uniformity assumptions, I have in mind a class of assumption which 
achieves uniformity across a discipline. My main example of global 
uniformity assumption is the principal behavioral assumption of 
neoclassical economics, homo economicus. By homo economicus I refer 
to an agent who maximizes (formal definition of rationality) his welfare 
(the self-interest operationalization of the formal definition). This 
assumption achieves behavioral uniformity across all discipline’s 
domain. By local uniformity assumptions I refer to assumptions that 
achieve uniformity at local level or at a certain model’s level. For 
example, the budget maximizing assumption achieves uniformity in 
Niskanen’s model world: all bureaucrats are the same. Similarly, the 
bilateral monopoly assumption achieves uniformity inside the model: the 
sponsor and the bureau chief are in the same relation across the entire Innovative Issues and Approaches in Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 2 
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model world. The reasons may be those of negligibility or of tractability 
(there is no second step assumption in Niskanen’s model), or both but 
the meta-statements needed to establish this are missing. What is sure 
is that we have assumptions which achieve uniformity. Global and local 
uniformity assumptions both achieve context invariance. No matter the 
context, the discipline world and the model world are uniform. This 
uniformity is not a bad thing per se, but it might be a problem if the real 
world is not really uniform. I think uniformity assumptions had better be 
true. If not, they had better be at least robust. I will develop this idea in 
the following section of the paper. 
 
Uniformity assumptions: Discussion 
Uniformity assumptions are not suspicious per se. To assume, for 
example, that objects fall as if there were a vacuum is to say that the 
nature is uniform in respect to this characteristic and it is not a 
problematic assumption. The same goes, for example, for assuming 
behavioral uniformity under the individualistic model of prey-predator 
described by Weisberg and Reisman in (2008): the model will still 
display the Voltera property. To assume, as neoclassical economics 
does, that all individuals are the same: instrumental, self-interested 
maximizers is, though, another thing. This obvious psychological 
unrealistic global uniformity assumption seems to be problematic at least 
in some circumstances which I will clarify in the following few lines.  
 
In (2013) I performed robustness analysis on Niskanen`s models of 
bureaucracy. I argued there, that those models were sensitive to some 
of their assumptions i.e. they were not robust with respect to those 
assumptions. I also argued that those assumptions had a uniformity 
effect in the model world but I did not fully explore the meaning of 
uniformity assumptions
8. Shortly stated, by robustness analysis I meant 
a non-empirical procedure of building models by incrementally modifying 
a certain assumption. Starting from that notion, I argued that if the result 
was constant under different specifications of a certain assumption, then 
that assumption was in, what I called, the causal core of the model. With 
these in mind we could return to the problem of the utility maximization 
global uniformity assumption (and its uniformity operationalized 
assumptions) from neoclassical economics. If this assumption is in the 
causal core of model then it had better be true at least in a behavioral 
way
9. So the circumstances mentioned above are connected to the 
                                                 
8 This task was assumed here.  
9 The distinction made here is between psychological realistic assumptions and 
behavioral realistic assumptions. If utility maximization is interpreted as a psychological 
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problem of robustness of results under different uniformity assumptions. 
If they are not in the causal core of the model then their unrealisticness 
is unproblematic. A good example is Becker`s
10 (1962) robustness 
analysis performed on the traditional model of household behavior. 
Replacing utility maximization with irrational (biased or random) 
preferences yields the same result. In my terms this means that the 
assumption was not in the causal core of the model and that its 
uniformity was not problematic. Concluding, my uniformity assumptions 
had better be true only when they have causal force in the model. This 
causal force could be traced by the help of robustness analysis.  
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